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IIC 99-2, Mergers of Accounting Firms
In June 1999, the Independence Issues Committee decided not to add this issue to its agenda.
Independence Issues Committee
Issue Summary No. 99-2 – Mergers of Accounting Firms
June 8, 1999
IIC-99-2
Introduction
1. Recent mergers of accounting firms and announcements by other firms of plans to merge suggest a
trend toward consolidation in the accounting industry. Such mergers can give rise to unique
independence issues for the firms involved, for the partners and professional employees of those firms,
and for the clients affected. Because of the sudden and dramatic change in "the firm," and therefore the
"members"1 to whom the independence rules will apply, many different, unusual, and unexpected
circumstances may need to be addressed.
2. This Issue Summary discusses some of the common independence issues that accounting firms may
face solely as a result of consummating a merger (or a similar consolidation) with another accounting firm.
It also examines various actions in response to those issues, including actions to safeguard the
independence of the merged firm,2 and its partners and professional employees.
3. Many of the situations described in this Issue Summary may be appropriate for the auditor to include in
his or her discussion with a client’s audit committee under ISB Standard No. 1, Independence
Discussions with Audit Committees.
Issues
4. A key issue that accounting firms may face during a merger is determining the date when
independence of each other’s clients is required and the period of time, if any, after that date during which
"members" must achieve compliance. Issues may arise involving one or more of the following areas:
a. Investments - by the firm, its partners, and other members in audit clients of
the other firm.
b. Family relationships – spouses, cohabitants, and dependents, and
nondependent close relatives of members of one firm own financial interests in or
hold official positions with audit clients of the other firm.
c. Non-audit services – rendered by one firm to audit clients of the other firm that
go beyond permitted services to audit clients.
d. Business relationships – between one firm and the audit clients of the other
firm that go beyond permitted relationships with audit clients.
e. Loans, depository, and brokerage relationships - of the firm and its members
with audit clients of the other firm.

Establishing the Merger Date
5. When two firms intend to merge their practices, a key issue is determining the merger date (i.e., the
date when each firm is required to be independent of the audit clients of the other firm). Often a number
of conditions must be met before a merger can occur. For example, a vote by each firm’s partners
approving the transaction is required, perhaps more than once during the negotiations. The approval of
one or more regulators also may be required. Once these votes and approvals are received, final
negotiations between the parties may need to occur, and other arrangements (such as registering with
state accountancy boards) may be required. However, the partner or regulatory approvals may bind
neither party and until the legal consummation date of the transaction, the possibility may still exist that
the merger will not occur.
Issue 1 - On what date is the requirement to be independent triggered (i.e., what is the "merger date")?
View A – "The Approval Date"- Both firms and the partners and professional employees of the firms are
required to be independent of the other firm’s clients when all necessary approvals (e.g., by the firms’
partners and, if applicable, by regulators) have been received that would enable the merger to take place.
6. Proponents of this view believe that once all necessary approvals have been received, the two firms
should effectively be treated as a merged firm. Proponents believe that partner and regulatory approvals
are the major (and often the most difficult) conditions that must be met to enable a merger to take place.
Further, they believe that upon receiving such approvals, the two firms could conduct certain activities
jointly without being in contravention of the law. For example, partners of both firms could begin meeting
with third parties to discuss combining two offices in the same city. Moreover, the time and effort invested
in gaining partner acceptance of the transaction and gaining regulatory approvals evidences a strong
commitment by both firms to move forward and makes it probable that the merger will be consummated.
While proponents acknowledge that prior to the consummation date of the merger either party could
decide not to complete the deal, they believe that is very unlikely to happen once partner and regulatory
approvals have been received. Thus, the merger date is the approval date. Prior to that date, both firms
should identify threats to independence that may arise as a result of the proposed merger, develop
safeguards in response to those threats, and be prepared to begin implementing them on the merger
date.
View B – "The Consummation Date" - Independence is required when the merger is consummated.
7. Proponents of this view recognize that, similar to the marriage of two individuals, each party has an
ability up to the legal consummation date to decide not to complete the merger. Negotiations and other
final arrangements that are necessary after partner and regulatory approvals are received must be
completed before the merger can occur. They also can make projecting the consummation date a matter
of speculation, especially since merger plans can dissolve at any time during the process. Moreover, if
the merger did not occur, requiring independence prior to the consummation date would be unnecessary
and could cause undue hardship for the clients, partners, and professional employees of both firms.
Therefore, the merger date is the legal consummation date (i.e., the effective date of the merger). Prior to
that date, both firms should identify the threats to independence that may arise as a result of the merger,
develop safeguards in response to those threats, and be prepared to begin implementing them on the
merger date.
Issue 2 – Should the merged firm, its partners, and its professional employees be given a brief period of
time after the merger date in which to achieve compliance with the independence rules?
8. The SEC’s independence rules contain little that deals with firm merger situations,3 except for
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 861,4 and in a brief reference in the recently issued
AAER No.1098. Further, the rules are silent with regard to transitional matters in connection with such
mergers. However, Rule 2-01(c) provides that "the Commission will give appropriate consideration to all

relevant circumstances" when deciding questions of independence. Further, two examples in the SEC’s
Codification of Financial Reporting Policies (CFRP)5 describe situations in which a firm was permitted to
provide otherwise precluded services to a client on an "emergency and temporary" basis in unusual
circumstances. Those circumstances may be no more unusual than the merger of two accounting firms.
View A – It is appropriate to provide a limited transition period during which compliance can be achieved.
9. Some believe it is extremely difficult for firms and members to achieve immediate compliance in certain
situations, regardless of which merger date in Issue 1 is controlling. For example, certain financial
interests requiring disposal may not be readily marketable (such as a limited partnership interest), and a
period of time may be required to change or unwind certain nonaudit services and business relationships.
Further, the examples in the SEC’s CFRP are an indication that the SEC staff have drawn a distinction
between independence issues that result from the ordinary activities of a firm and those that result from
unusual circumstances. The merger of two accounting firms is sufficiently unusual to warrant a brief
transition period during which compliance may be achieved.
10. Under this view, safeguards, when necessary, should be employed during the transition period to
mitigate threats to the merged firm’s independence. The ISB staff applied a threats and safeguards
approach in addressing a merger-related situation involving the Australian firms of Coopers and Lybrand
and Price Waterhouse.6 View A proponents believe such an approach is appropriate.
View B – There should be no transition period; compliance is required immediately on the merger date.
11. Proponents of this view desire to adhere to a strict application of the independence rules on the
merger date and believe there should be exceptions only in emergency situations. They believe AAER
No. 861 suggests that compliance is required immediately on the merger date. They also point to Section
602.017 of the CFRP as suggesting that immediate compliance should be required. They also argue that
both firms should be well aware of the matters that will need to be addressed once the merger occurs,
would have an opportunity to begin planning well in advance of the merger date, and therefore should be
in a position to implement the necessary corrective actions immediately at the merger date. Thus, the
situation does not qualify as an emergency and should not receive special treatment.
12. Opponents of this view argue that implementing any corrective action in advance of the merger date
would disrupt existing relationships with clients and burden partners and professional employees
prematurely and possibly unnecessarily (i.e., if the merger ultimately does not go through). Thus, while
corrective actions can to some extent be decided upon and planned, they should not be required to be
implemented until the merger has occurred.
Investments
13. As a result of the merger, the merged firm or a member of the merged firm may hold a direct or
material indirect financial interest in an audit client of the merged firm that was permitted prior to the
merger but is prohibited after the merger (because the client was a client of the other firm). Such interests
may include, for example, investments by a firm’s retirement plan, individual investments by a firm and
members of the firm, and investments held in employee benefit plans by a member’s spouse that include
client mutual funds or stock of the employer/client. Under Rule 2-01(b)(1), independence is considered to
be impaired if a firm or a member of a firm owned an investment in an audit client during the period of the
firm’s engagement to audit the financial statements or at the date of the firm’s report on those statements.
Some investments are liquid because, for example, a ready market exists for the investments and, thus,
they can be disposed of with little or no difficulty. Other investments are illiquid and as a result may be
very difficult to dispose of (e.g., restricted stock or limited partnership interests) or even inaccessible
because of constraints established by law (e.g., stock held in certain employee benefit plans).
Issue 3 – When should investments that become prohibited as a result of the merger be disposed of?

View A – The disposal process should begin immediately on the merger date and be completed within
thirty days if the investment is liquid and ninety days if the investment is illiquid.
14. Proponents of this view believe that a thirty-day period for liquid investments is necessary to allow
individuals who may be out of town or out of the country on the date independence is required (e.g.,
because they are on assignment or on vacation) a reasonable period of time to comply. It also provides
sufficient time to enable members to conduct a thorough review and analysis of the list of new clients
(and other entities) requiring independence as a result of the merger. In addition, the time period provides
an allowance for dealing with difficult or unexpected matters such as replacing lost stock certificates,
miscommunications with brokers, and the consequences of divorce proceedings.
15. For illiquid investments, including investments that are not transferable in their present state and
those subject to judicial or similar constraints, the ninety-day period is necessary to allow members to
work out arrangements with the issuers or the courts to permit disposal of investments by sale,
redemption, gift, or forfeiture (except in situations involving certain employee benefit plans).
View B – The disposal process should begin immediately on the merger date and be completed within
five business days if the investment is liquid and ninety days if the investment is illiquid.
16. Proponents assert that the time it takes a broker to settle a transaction on behalf of an investor is
generally no more than five days. Accordingly, investments for which there is a ready market can be and
should be disposed of within that time period. While there is general acknowledgement that unexpected
difficulties can arise in disposing of otherwise liquid investments, View B proponents would hold members
to the five-day disposal period and deal with difficulties on a case-by-case basis.
View C – Investments should be disposed of on the merger date.
17. View C proponents believe that it is the responsibility of the firms to inform each member of the
expected merger date and the responsibility of the members to anticipate that date and plan their
disposals accordingly. These proponents recognize that a merger date is likely to be a moving date as a
result of delays in negotiations, receiving approvals, etc. While such delays may disrupt the timing of a
planned disposition, proponents assert that they also afford members more time to plan their disposals,
which makes it harder to justify not being prepared to dispose on the merger date. An inability to
immediately dispose of problem investments could necessitate termination either of the individual or the
audit relationship.
Issue 4 – How should situations be handled in which the law prohibits disposal of an investment held by a
benefit plan for a partner’s spouse?
18. The prevalence of two-earner households and the popularity of employee benefit plans, such as the
401(k) plan, create the potential for a number of difficult situations involving investments in a client’s stock
through the benefit plan. For example, the spouse of a partner of one firm may be employed (in an
acceptable position) by a client of the other firm and have an investment in the stock of the
employer/client held by the company’s 401(k) plan. Such plans generally do not allow for transfers or
withdrawals of the stock unless the spouse terminates employment, and some plans require that the
spouse also be of retirement age. In addition, ERISA8 provides that benefit plan participants may not
alienate their right to receive benefits from the plan. Thus, the spouse may not forfeit his or her interest in
the stock. Under normal conditions, the SEC’s example in this area9 would preclude this type of situation
from occurring to begin with. However, in this case the spouse’s investment through the plan was
permitted when it initially occurred (because the employer was not a client of the partner's former firm)
and requires corrective action solely because of the merger.
View A – Further investments by the spouse in the client’s stock should be precluded, and the existing
investment should be temporarily "grandfathered." The partner should not provide any services, either

directly or indirectly, to the client and may not supervise any of the partners or professional employees
who provide any services to the client. The partner also must commit that upon the spouse gaining the
right to dispose of the stock, he or she will do so immediately.
19. View A proponents recognize that obtaining the stock from the benefit plan for any purpose is
impossible without a plan amendment to permit such a transaction. They further assume that in most
cases clients will be unwilling to amend their plans for the sake of one plan participant. View A
proponents also believe that this situation (i.e., a permitted investment becomes impermissible because
of a merger of firms) was not contemplated in the SEC example. Further, because of the constraints
imposed by law, which deny access to the stock and preclude participants from giving up their rights to it,
these proponents believe this situation should be viewed as analogous to those in some non-U.S.
countries where the auditor is required by local law to own stock in his or her audit client and the SEC
staff has not objected to the auditor’s independence.10 View A proponents argue that ownership of a
direct financial interest in an audit client that is permitted in non-U.S. situations when such ownership is
required by law is not substantially different from having a financial interest in the stock of an employer
audit client through an employee benefit plan for which disposal is precluded by U.S. law. Nonetheless,
View A proponents would insist on the safeguards described to protect the merged firm’s independence.
View B - Apply View A only if the stock held by the plan is immaterial to the member.
20. View B proponents believe that an indirect interest through a benefit plan is too difficult to justify if it is
material to the member.
View C - Allow no special concessions.
21. If the investment cannot be made acceptable under the rules, then either the partner or the audit
relationship must be terminated.
Family relationships
22. At the merger date, a spouse, cohabitant, or dependent person of a member of one firm may hold a
position with an audit client of the other firm that is covered by SEC CFRP Section 602.02.h. In addition, a
nondependent close relative may hold such a position or own a material financial interest in an audit
client. Resolution of such matters often requires a detailed analysis of the relative’s employment position,
lengthy discussions with client management, and, in the case of partners and managers, discussions
within the firm about moving the individual involved to achieve geographic separation (for partners), to
remove a manager from the member category for that client, or to terminate a partner or an audit
relationship. And, in some cases, the client involved may consider changing the responsibilities of the
relative. Moving the member also would be appropriate to resolve financial interest matters involving
nondependent close relatives. While the ultimate resolution is being decided upon, the merged firm may
need to start or complete an audit shortly after the merger occurs.
Issue 5 – What actions with respect to the first audit after the merger should be taken when spouses,
cohabitants, and dependents, and nondependent close relatives of members of one firm hold proscribed
positions with audit clients of the other firm (or when nondependent close relatives hold material financial
interests in a client) at the merger date?
View A – If certain safeguards are implemented, the merged firm may perform the first audit after the
merger.
23. If the relative is a spouse, cohabitant, or dependent, or a nondependent close relative and the
member is a partner or manager, for the first audit after the merger, the engagement team, including the
engagement partner, must come from either of the following:

a. an office located in another city, or
b. an office in the same city as the partner and manager (other than the office of the
partner or manager with the family relationship)11 provided that for the period from the
merger date through the completion of the first audit:
•

individuals on the engagement team do not serve any audit clients of the other firm, and

•

the partner or manager with the family relationship does not serve any audit clients of the
other firm and does not supervise any of the other firm’s professional staff.

24. View A proponents argue that while a. above may be preferable to some, the safeguards outline in b.
provide in substance the same result and that both safeguards substantially mitigate any threat that the
partner or manager could be perceived as possessing the ability to influence the conduct of the audit.
View B – The first audit after the merger must be conducted from an office located in a city different from
that of the partner or manager with the family relationship.
25. View B proponents are less concerned about the disruption to the client of changing audit teams
temporarily and are more concerned about preserving the appearance of independence. While they
agree that both actions provide in substance the same result, View B proponents believe that the action in
23 a. is more compelling from an appearance standpoint than the action in 23 b. which walls off the
partner and manager from the audit engagement team and the professionals of the other firm.
View C - Apply the present rules regardless of the merger.
26. View C proponents would require, for example, that adequate geographic separation be achieved
immediately for nondependent close relative situations involving members. They would take the position
that if adequate geographic separation is not achieved or if a member’s spouse will continue in his or her
employment position after the merger date, the merged firm must immediately terminate the member or
the audit relationship.
Non-Audit Services
27. Non-audit services may have been rendered by one firm to audit clients of the other firm that go
beyond permitted services to audit clients because independence was not required when the services
were initially agreed to or rendered. For example, one firm may have rendered bookkeeping services to
the audit client of the other firm that would not meet the SEC’s limited exception to providing such
services. After the merger, the merged firm may be asked to audit the financial statements covering the
period during which the services were rendered.
Issue 6 – Should safeguards be established with respect to audit procedures performed after the merger?
If so, what types of safeguards would be appropriate?
View A – Yes. A threat and safeguard analysis is necessary to mitigate the effects of having performed
management functions and the possibility of self-review.
28. Proponents of View A believe that it is not enough to argue that the services were rendered at a time
when the firm rendering the service was not required to be independent. If the results of those services
will be subject to audit by the merged firm, safeguards such as the following should be considered after
analyzing the threats to avoid the possibility of self-review or mitigate the effects of having performed
management functions:

a. assumption by the client or a third party for judgments made in rendering the non-audit
service,
b. re-performance of the work by a third party,
c. special internal reviews of the audit, depending on the significance of the non-audit
service to the financial statements.
View B – Yes. However, safeguards in addition to those supported by proponents of View A also should
be implemented.
29. View B proponents believe that the safeguards supported by proponents of View A do not go far
enough in protecting the independence of the auditor. In addition to those safeguards, members of the
firm that rendered the non-audit service should be precluded from participating in any audit-related
activity for the client. Also, for the first audit after the merger, to the extent possible, the merged firm
should maintain in place the team responsible for the audit immediately prior to the merger.
View C – Yes, but safeguards may be used only if the non-audit service was not material to the client.
30. View C proponents believe that if the non-audit service was material to the client (e.g., bookkeeping at
a client’s significant subsidiary), the threat to independence is too strong to overcome with safeguards. In
that case, if the service was rendered to a significant subsidiary of the client, another auditor would need
to audit the subsidiary’s financial statements. If the service was rendered directly to the parent, the
merged firm would need to resign the audit relationship. If the non-audit service was not material to the
client, View C proponents would adopt View A or B depending on the facts and circumstances.
Issue 8 – May the non-audit service be continued for a limited period of time after the merger date if
appropriate safeguards (such as those described above) are implemented?
31. Some non-audit services may involve legally binding contracts and may extend into several future
periods during which the merged firm will be asked to perform the audit.
View A – Yes, if certain conditions are met.
32. Proponents of View A recognize that to the extent that a legally binding contract governing a service
is in place, a significant amount of time and effort may be required to break the contract. In addition,
finding a new non-audit service provider may require time and effort on the part of the client and an
immediate cessation of the service on or before the merger date may cause the client undue harm and
disruption. If the client reasonably believes this to be the case, the service may continue for a reasonable
and limited transitional period (determined by an analysis of the threats) if all of the following conditions
are met:
a. the non-audit service is neither reaffirmed nor renewed beyond its original term nor
expanded with respect to its scope;
b. the merged firm does not undertake senior management, financial, or controllership
functions or otherwise exercise significant influence over the client’s operating, financial,
or accounting policies;
c. members of the firm that render the non-audit service are precluded from participating
in any audit-related activity for the client for the period during which the non-audit service
is rendered; and

d. the firm maintains in place the team responsible for the audit immediately prior to the
merger to the extent possible.
33. View A proponents believe that if these conditions are met, in particular b., the client will not appear to
be substantially dependent on the firm’s skill and judgment but reliant only to the extent of the customary
type of consultation or advice. In addition, as a result of condition a., the firm should not be perceived as
having an incentive to compromise its objectivity to preserve a non-audit services engagement.
View B – Yes. However, in addition to the conditions set forth in View A, the non-audit service must be
immaterial to both the firm and the client.
34. View B proponents recognize the difficulty some clients will face in trying to quickly replace certain
non-audit services. Nonetheless, they believe an important mitigating factor that must be present to allow
the continuation of the service for a brief period of time after the merger is that the service be immaterial
to both the firm and the client. If it is material to either party, View B proponents believe that reasonable
investors will perceive the service as too important for the auditor to be disinterested, impartial, and
objective when conducting the audit, despite implementing the other safeguards.
View C - Yes. However, in addition to the conditions set forth in View A, if the services are performed at a
material subsidiary, that subsidiary should be audited by a different firm.
35. View C proponents would require a separate auditor if the subsidiary is material to the consolidated
financial statements. They believe this additional safeguard is important to address concerns that the
merged firm will effectively be reviewing work it performed which is material to the consolidated financial
statements. Since another firm would be responsible for the audit of the material subsidiary, that concern
is alleviated.
View D – No.
36. View D proponents believe that despite the conditions set forth in the approaches supported by Views
A, B and C proponents, and notwithstanding the legal difficulties in dissolving related contracts and the
practical difficulties in the client finding a suitable replacement service provider, there is too significant an
independence issue with continuing to render prohibited non-audit services after the merger, whether or
not immaterial. Therefore the service must be discontinued.
Business relationships
37. Certain business relationships (i.e., those covered by Section 602.02.g of the SEC’s CFRP) may exist
between one firm and the audit clients of the other firm that go beyond permitted relationships with audit
clients because independence was not required when the relationships were entered into. Those
relationships, which may be governed by a legally binding contract, may still be in existence at the merger
date.
Issue 9 - May the business relationship be continued in its present state for a limited period of time after
the merger if appropriate safeguards are implemented?
View A – Yes, provided that certain conditions are met.
38. View A proponents believe that the nature of a business relationship can be revised to eliminate the
potential impairment and believe such changes should be implemented whenever possible. When that is
not possible, the answer generally is to dissolve the relationship as soon as possible after the merger,
and such dissolution should be undertaken wherever practicable. However, dissolving a business
relationship, especially one evidenced by a contractual arrangement, will require a significant amount of

time and effort for both parties. For example, the client will need to search for the appropriate
replacement and the firm will need to transition responsibilities to that entity.
39. Under this view, if the client requests that the relationship continue for a limited transition period
(determined by an analysis of the threats) to avoid undue harm and disruption, the following conditions
must be met:
a. the business relationship cannot be reaffirmed or renewed beyond its original term nor
expanded with respect to its scope;
b. members of the firm involved in the business relationship are precluded from
participating in any audit-related activity for the client;
c. the merged firm maintains in place the team responsible for the audit immediately prior
to the merger to the extent possible.
40. View A proponents believe that condition a., coupled with the fact that the relationship may continue
only for a limited transition period, precludes the perception that the firm has an incentive to conduct its
audit in less than an objective manner. They point to the fact that because there would be no ability to
preserve the business relationship, there would be no incentive to be less than objective when conducting
an audit.
View B – Yes. However, in addition to the safeguards in View A, in no event may the relationship continue
in its present state beyond the first audit after the merger unless the relationship is immaterial.
41. View B proponents believe that if the business relationship is material, it should be terminated before
the firm commences the year-end phase of its audit. They believe that despite the safeguards set forth in
View A, the firm could be perceived as having the incentive to be less than objective during its audit
simply because the relationship is material. In their view, applying a materiality restriction is important to
reduce the risk of creating a mutuality of interest. They point to existing rules on indirect business
relationships (which are permitted only if they are immaterial to the firm and to the client) for support.
View C - Yes. However, in addition to the conditions set forth in View A, if the business relationship was
with a material subsidiary, that subsidiary should be audited by a different firm.
42. View C proponents would require a separate auditor if the subsidiary is material to the consolidated
financial statements. They believe that a mutuality of interest arising from a business relationship with a
material subsidiary is not as susceptible to mitigation through the application of certain safeguards as is a
self review threat, so this added safeguard would always be necessary.
View D – No.
43. View D proponents believe that despite the conditions and safeguards set forth in the approaches
supported by Views A, B and C proponents, and notwithstanding the legal difficulties in dissolving related
contracts and the practical difficulties in the client finding a suitable replacement, there is too significant
an independence issue with continuing to remain in a direct business relationship after the merger,
whether or not immaterial. Therefore, the auditor must discontinue the relationship or, depending on the
pervasiveness of that relationship, resign the engagement.
Loan, depository, and brokerage relationships
Issue 10 - Should a limited transition period after the merger date be permitted to make necessary
changes to loan, depository, and brokerage relationships, if appropriate safeguards are implemented?

View A – Yes, but the permitting of a transition period should be based on facts and circumstances.
44. View A proponents note that some loan, deposit, and brokerage arrangements may include
contractual restrictions or other complexities that make them difficult, and perhaps impossible, to get out
of immediately on or even shortly after the merger date. For example, material unsecured loans of the
firm may require extensive negotiations to withdraw from and require substantial time and effort to place
with a new lender. In addition, significant penalties may be triggered by such actions. The merged firm
should analyze each situation to understand the difficulties involved and the threats to independence of
an inability to move a relationship immediately. If appropriate safeguards can be established, such as
those discussed in this Issue Summary in previous issues, it is appropriate to permit a limited transition
period.
View B - No. The requisite actions should take place on or shortly after the merger date.
45. View B proponents believe that the firm and its members should be planning well in advance of the
expected merger date to move these relationships on the merger date. Thus, loans that are not
grandfatherable, deposit amounts that are materially in excess of insured limits, and margin or
discretionary accounts with client brokers must be moved on or shortly after the merger date. It is not
relevant that the firm or the member would be subject to a penalty imposed by the client for doing so. If
the requisite actions cannot be implemented on or shortly after the merger date, the merged firm would
need to terminate its audit relationship with the client.
46. Opponents of this view argue that if such relationships (especially loan arrangements that are not
grandfatherable) require extensive work to move, it is unrealistic to expect that such a move can be
accomplished on or shortly after the merger date. Further, it is punitive to the firm, members of the firm,
and the clients involved to require corrective actions to be implemented so quickly given the difficulties in
establishing the merger date.
1
The terms "member" and "members" are used herein as defined in Rule 2-01(b) of SEC Regulation S-X
and includes certain relatives as required under SEC rules.
2

For purposes of this issue summary, the term "merged firm" refers to the combined firm that results when
two firms merge.

3

Example 3 in Section 602.02.b.ii of the SEC's Codification of Financial Reporting Policies deals with a
merger situation but its focus is on the effectiveness of using an irrevocable trust to hold prohibited
investments after a merger occurs.

4

In the Matter of Michael Goodbread, CPA, the SEC stated, "It is clear from Section 602.01 of the FRC
that had Goodbread sold the Kroger stock when the merger of the accounting firms became effective that
no question would be raised about independence...Goodbread engaged in unethical and improper
professional conduct by: 1. Failing to immediately divest himself of stock ownership of an SEC client
when he became a partner of the merged firm..."

5

See Example 6 (limited bookkeeping assistance) in Section 602.02.c.ii and Example 12 (back up rental
of computer time) in Section 602.02.g.
6

Refer to the ISB staff's response to Coopers & Lybrand - Australia dated July 22, 1998 located on the
ISB's website at www.cpaindependence.org.
7

Section 602.01 states in part: "Another example is where an accountant held stock in a company for
which he had never had an engagement but sold it upon accepting an engagement. In these and other
situations where it is clear from the facts that the independent status of the accountant is not prejudiced

by a particular relationship, we will upon request advise the accountant that no action will be taken
because of this relationship."
8

ERISA refers to the Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended.

9

See Example 3 of SEC CFRP Section 602.02.h.

10

See the Staff Report on Auditor Independence (March 1994) footnote 132.

11

This assumes that after the merger the merged firm will have two offices in the same city for a period of
time.
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